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EFFECT ON CONTRACTS OF WAR ORDERS OR OTHER ACTS OF STATE
It has generally been stated to be the rule that impossibility arising
subsequently to the formation of the contract does not excuse a con-
tractor from the usual consequences of non-performance; he must
pay damages to the other party.' To this rule, however, there are
several classes of exceptions: first, where the impossibility is caused
by a change in the domestic law; secondly, where the subject-matter
of the contract is destroyed; and thirdly, where the impossibility is
caused by death or illness of the party bound to perform. As has
been asserted in this JOURNAL, 2 these exceptions practically nullify the
general rule. It is believed that no case can be found where a
promisor has been held to pay damages for failing to perform an act
that has become absolutely impossible without any fault of his own.
The rule it is believed should be stated to be that a contractor is not
excused from performing merely on the ground of increased difficulty
or expense.
The question of impossibility as an excuse for non-performance
has come up in a somewhat new aspect in a number of cases during
the great war. Thus in Moore & Tierney v. Roxford Knitting Co.
(1918, N. D. N. Y.) 250 Fed. 278, where a buyer claimed damages
for failure to make and deliver goods as per contract, the seller
replied that it was prevented from performing because of orders for
goods given by the United States government for war purposes, these
orders having precedence by Act of Congress.' By reason of the non-
delivery, the buyer had himself declared the contract at an end. As
in many other cases during the war the negotiations between the
manufacturer and the government agents were very informal. The
agent had asked what was the mill's capacity for making knitted
goods for the government, and further said, "I would request you
not to write me that you are sold up and cannot furnish any of these
goods. I am aware that this condition prevails with every one."
Later an order was given requiring the mill's full oapacity and advis-
ing that the order was obligatory, although no reference was made
to the Acts of Cotigress. These Acts provided that orders of the
government "shall be obligatory" and "shall take precedence over
all other orders and contracts." Refusal to comply was made a crime;
and on refusal to fill orders at reasonable prices the President was
authorized to take possession of the factory.
The court held that the informal order was obligatory and that the
seller acted under compulsion; also that the contractual duty to the
'Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn, 26.
'Discharge of Contract (1913) 22 YA= LAW JOURNAL, 513, 519.
"Nat'l Defence Act, June 3, 1916, 39 St at L. 166, and Naval Appropriations
Act, March 4, 1917, 39 St. at L. 1168.
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buyer was at an end and that the buyer had no right to damages for
breach. It would have been otherwise had the seller voluntarily sought
the government work and thus intentionally disabled itself from
performing the contract with the buyer.4
It is to be observed that in the Roxford Knitting Company case the
duty to deliver as agreed was expressly subject to delays or non-
delivery by reason of strikes, accidents, or for any reason beyond the
control of the seller. The decision might well be regarded as resting
upon this provision, although little was said of it. Even in the
absence of such a provision, however, the decision would probably
be the same. Thus in a late English case,5 where a claim for damages
was made for failure to deliver raspberries as agreed, and where the
contract apparently contained no similar provision, it was held to be
a good defense that the government had requisitioned the defendant's
whole supply.8
In the case of the knitting company, stated above, the government
order did not make performance totally impossible; for not only
could the goods have been manufactured after the government work
was done, but it was not totally impossible to increase the size and
capacity of the plant-admitting that this night have been extremely
difficult and expensive. The seller did not claim to be totally dis-
charged but claimed only that delay was justified. This would be
correct, and the buyer would still be bound to pay for the goods, unless
the delay should prove to be so great as to prevent what is often called
"This principle is specifically applied in the still more recent case of Mawhin-
ney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills (x918, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 461. If
the government contract is voluntarily sought because of war profits, or if the
government in a~varding the contract did not demand precedence in accordance
with the Act of Congress, the contractor is not excused for failure to perform
his private contract
For another and more doubtful variation in the application of the rule, see
Standard Silk D. Co. v. Roessler (1917) 244 Fed. 25o, (i918) 27 YALE LAW
JoTRbNAL, 408.
'Lipton v. Ford [1917] 2 K. B. 647.
'The English statute differs somewhat from the Acts of Congress. "It is
hereby declared that where the fulfilment by any person of any contract is
interfered with by the necessity on the part of himself or any other person of
complying with (government requirements) . . . . that necessity is a good
defense to any action or proceeding taken against that person in respect of
the non-fulfilment of the contract so far as it is due to that interference."
Defence of the Realm, No. 2, Act (5 Geo. 5, c. 37) sec. i, sub-sec. 2. Under
such a statute as this a contractor would be excused by much less than a totalimpossibility, and it would be unnecessary to determine whether the contract
called for specific raspberries or berries to be grown- on specific land, as in
Howell v. Coupland (1876) L. R. i Q. B. D. 258.
Where the contract contains a provision like that in the principal case it is
clearly discharged by a government requisition of the entire plant Metropolitan
Water Board v. Dick (1917, H. L.) 117 L. T. Rep. 766. See (i918) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 953.
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"substantial performance." The buyer's duty to pay would surely be
constructively conditional upon performance within some period of
time that would be reasonable.
A contract containing a provision like that in the knitting case
really creates no duty to deliver goods at all events but only a duty
to deliver in case reasonable diligence would cause performance to
take place.7  Even in the absence of such a provision, there is a ten-
dency to excuse a contractor by something less than absolute impos-
sibility." But mere "economic unprofitableness," even though that
is due to war conditions, is not an excuse for failure to perform.9
In one of the cases cited above0 the court denied that mere impos-
sibility caused by an act of the legislature or of the executive would
excuse a contractor, saying that the "true rule is that where per-
formance of a contract, legal when made, becomes illegal, by some
event, statute, decision, or lawful act of public authorities, both parties
are excused from further performance." Of course this rule is cor-
rect in its affirmative form. Where impossibility of performance arises
from a change in the law of our own country, making performance
of a previously made contract unlawful, the obligation is dissolved
and there is no liability for non-performance.1 ' That the court's
'So in Davison Chemical Co. v. Baugh Chemical Co. (1918, Md. App.) 1O4
At. 4o4, a manufacturer of acid was excused from delivery because war in
Europe made the procurement of pyrites impossible. A better acid could have
been made from brimstone, which was obtainable; but the expense would have
been twice as great. A similar decision was rendered by the House of Lords
in Wilson & Co. v. Tennants [1917] A. C. 495.
"See North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co. (1917, U. S.) 37 Sup. Ct
49o; Clarksville Land Co. v. Harriman (1895) 68 N. H. 374, 44 Atl. 527;
Baily v. De Crespigny (1869) L. R. 4 Q. B. i8o. Cf. Watts & Co. v. Mitsui(H. L.) [1917] A. C. 227. In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard (1916) 172 Cal.
289, 156 Pac. 458, the court said that "prohibitive cost" was the same as impos-
sibility "to all fair intents." A similar statement was made by Maule, J., in
Dahl v. Nelson (18i) 6 App. Cas. 38, 52.
'Wilson & Co. v. Tennants [1917] 1 K. B. 208, [1917] A. C. 495; Dixon v.
Henderson (1917, K. B.) 112 L. T. Rep. 636. In a general way this is admitted
by the court in Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, supra.
1
oMawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, supra.
I Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Mottley (1911) 219 U. S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265;
Cowley v. N. P. R. R. Co. (1912) 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998; Cordes v.
Miller (1878) 39 Mich. 581; Jamieson v. Indiana Nat. Gas Co. (1891) 128 Ind.
555, 28 N. E. 76; Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. O'Donnell (1892) 49 Ohio St
489, 32 N. E. 476; Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Assn. (1918) 92 Conn. 621,
1O3 Atl. 838, (1918) 28 YALE LAW jou AL, 198. If the contract was made
subsequently to the passage of the law, it was illegal and void ab initio.
It appears also that a promisor's liability may be terminated where his per-
formance is prevented by some act of the state, even though the act is brought
about by the fault or inefficiency of the promisor himself. Hughes v. Wamsutta
Mills (1865, Mass.) Ii Allen, 2oi (prevention by imprisonment for crime);
State v. Herber (1918, Okla.) 173 Pac. 651 (bondsmen discharged when their
HeinOnline -- 28 Yale L.J. 401 1918-1919
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555, z8 N. E. 76; Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. O'Donnell (18gz) 49 Ohio St.
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rule is correct in its negative part may well be doubted. The state-
ment of Lord Reading' 2 is to be preferred: "It is true that the act
to be performed was not rendered unlawful by an act of the legis-
lature passed since the entering into of the contract, but it was a law-
ful act of state which equally rendered the delivery of these specific
goods impossible."'
3
It is altogether probable that a contract the performance of which
would require a breach of the law of some friendly nation would now
be held to be illegal and void. If this is true, and possibly even if it
is not, a change in some foreign law making the performance of a
previously made contract illegal (or impossible) ought to be given the
same effect as would a like change in the domestic law.14
A. L. C.
failure to produce prisoner in court was caused by his imprisonment for another
crime); Moshenz v. Independent Order etc. (1913) 215 Mass. 185, 102 N. E.
324 (injunction due to illegal acts); People v. Globe Mut. L. I. Co. (1883)
91 N. Y. 174 (dissolution of corporation for failure to maintain a reserve).
But impossibility due to bankruptcy does not terminate liability. Central. Trust
Co. v. Chicago Auditorium (1915) 24o U. S. 581, 36 Sup. Ct. 412.
'In re Shipton and Harrison's Arbitration [1915] 3 K. B. 676.
"A case might be put where performance is rendered impossible by an unlaw-
ful act of the commander in chief.
" See Ford v. Cotesworth (187o) L. R_ 5 Q. B. 544; Cunningham v. Dunn
(1878) 3 C. P. D. 443. This aspect of the matter is treated at length by Lorenzen,
Moratory Legislation Relating to Bills and Notes and the Conflict of Laws,
supra, p. 324.
HeinOnline -- 28 Yale L.J. 402 1918-1919
402 RNAL
t
ing1 re : It t
r ed l
i
i i l ."13
t r t e
f




r t t er
ml t r . ) .
i j tion t ill l t ; l . l t. . I. . ( 3)
l tion ti rve).
t tral- st
. . i go it i 5) 0 . . , . t. .
12 In ar i ~s itration .
13 -
r •
.. rd rth 0) ; mmi . mm
78) t ,
t ry ti i li t ,
ra, . -
